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The Joint Modular Intermodal Distribution System (JMIDS) is a Joint Capability 
Technology Demonstration (JCTD) initiative approved by the Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts.  The purpose of JCTD is to evaluate a joint 
capability through Military Utility Assessments (MUAs) under a variety of military 
scenarios as JMIDS aims to address interoperability problems facing the military supply 
chain.  The current sustainment modules and platforms used among the services lack: 
• Transportability across different modes without re-handling/packaging 
• Quick reconfiguration for onward movement within an Area of Operation 
• Traceability with integrated tags to ensure on-time, direct delivery from 
depot to end user 
• Ease of returnability in retrograde operations.   
The operation concept of JMIDS is to provide a universal intermodal container 
system for automated handling, storage, and tracking of supply and ammunition 
shipments throughout the four Services in order to enhance visibility and increase 
efficiency in the supply chain.  This Joint Modular Intermodal capability is achieved 
through the use of Joint Modular Intermodal Containers (JMIC), Joint Modular 
Intermodal Platforms (JMIP), and Automated Identification Technology (AIT).  Through 
the use of these three systems, JMIDS permits the efficient and seamless movement of 
supplies and retrograde operations through the air, land and sea distribution system to all 
military locales.  The purpose of this project is to analyze the costs of implementing the 
JMIDS capability within the Defense Distribution System (DDS).  This thesis will: 
• Examine the theoretical framework of modularity and its application 
throughout the commercial marketplace. 
• Conduct a life cycle cost analysis of JMIDS. 
• Develop a recommendation for the way forward based on the findings of 
the JMIDS life cycle cost analysis and the feedback from site visit to 
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 This research study examines the concept of modularity and its successes in the 
commercial marketplace.  At the same time, the study determines if the implementation 
of modularity in the Defense Distribution System (DDS) through the development of a 
new container system is economical and feasible.  Moreover, the study recommends the 
way forward in terms of a solution for resolving problems of interoperability, visibility, 
and reliability in the DDS.  The research paper begins with a literature review to discuss 
the history and push for interoperability and improved logistics.  Next, the paper 
addresses the concept of modularity as applied by companies like UPS and FedEx to 
improve their respective supply chains.  Afterwards, the research conducts a life cycle 
cost analysis of the JMIDS to identify the total cost of the developing such a system and 
answer the question of affordability and practicality.  Based on the cost analysis and 
information gathered from a site visit by the research group to DDJC, the paper 
concludes with recommendations for the future of JMIDS and DDS to improve the 
current supply chain. 
A.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
Released on May 30, 2000 and signed by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Army General Henry Shelton, “Joint Vision 2020” extends the concept laid out in 
“Joint Vision 2010” of continuing the transformation of America’s armed forces to 
achieve full-spectrum dominance by having the ability to defeat any adversary and 
control any situation across a full spectrum of military operations – “persuasive in peace, 
decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.”1  According to “Joint Vision 2020,” 
the way to achieve the goal of full-spectrum dominance is to invest in and develop new 
military capabilities in four key areas: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, 
focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection.  The report states that these four 
                                                 
1 Jim Garamone.  “Joint Vision 2020 Emphasizes Full-spectrum Dominance,” American Forces Press 
Service, June 2, 2000.  Last accessed February 15, 2007.  
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/n06022000_20006025.html. 
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capabilities must center on a joint force: "To build the most effective force for 2020, we 
must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally and 
technically.”2 
The report identifies interoperability as the foundation of effective joint, 
multinational, and interagency operations and mandates interoperability for the joint 
force of 2020 – especially in terms of communications, common logistics items, and 
information sharing: “The joint force has made significant progress toward achieving an 
optimum level of interoperability, but there must be a concerted effort toward continued 
improvement.”3  Improvements include further development of common technologies 
and processes in order to provide responsive, flexible, and precise product support at all 
levels of operations.  Interoperability increases the adaptation of the support to the needs 
of combat forces that are increasingly more mobile and dispersed and facilitates product 
support within a shorter amount of time.  
Interoperability is a critical element of providing focused logistics.  “Joint Vision 
2020” defines focused logistics as the ability to provide the joint force the right 
personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time, and in the right 
quantity, across the full range of military operations.4  Through a real-time, web-based 
information system providing total asset visibility as part of a common relevant 
operational picture, focused logistics will effectively link the operator and logistician 
across services and support agencies.  With the integration of information, logistics, and 
transportation technologies, focused logistics will provide the joint warfighter with 
support for all functions.  
“Joint Vision 2020” also outlines that focused logistics will “provide a more 
seamless connection to the commercial sector to take advantage of applicable advanced 
business practices and commercial economies,” which will combine with innovative 
processes to dramatically improve end-to-end management of the entire logistics system 
                                                 
2 JCS Director for Strategic Plans and Policy.  Joint Vision 2020.  US Government Printing Office.  
Washington DC, June 2000. p. 2. 
3 Ibid., p. 21. 
4 Ibid., p. 30. 
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and provide precise real-time control of the logistics pipeline to support the joint force 
commander’s priorities.5  The integration of advanced transportation systems which are 
faster and more efficient with greater capacity will further improve deployment, 
distribution, and sustainment in asymmetric engagements.  According to Joint Vision 
2020, the asymmetric approaches of our adversaries are perhaps the most serious danger 
the United States faces in the immediate future.  These asymmetric approaches include 
terrorist attacks in an urban environment, long-range ballistic missiles, and insurgencies 
in unstable countries which are linked to U.S. interests. 
According to a recently published business case analysis on the Joint Distance 
Support and Response (JDSR) program, the author assessed the current DOD product 
support infrastructure and processes as being “optimized to meet the military operations 
of the twentieth century, which operated primarily within well-defined battle lines.”6  The 
design of the current infrastructure and processes are too slow for the current asymmetric 
environment.  The infrastructure and processes are unique to each branch of service of 
the military and use aging transportation assets, limited communications networks, and 
rudimentary tracking capabilities.   
In 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) established a plan to improve some of 
the systemic weaknesses in supply chain management since the military operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan have focused attention on DOD’s supply chain management.  With 
the asymmetric warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) reported that the supply chain plays a major role in outcomes on the battlefield, 
and therefore, substantial investment of resources in improving the supply chain was 
necessary.7  With the encouragement of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
DOD’s plan included the integration of supply chain management with broader defense 
                                                 
5 JCS Director for Strategic Plans and Policy.  Joint Vision 2020.  US Government Printing Office.  
Washington DC, June 2000. p. 31.  
6 Sheng Lim Hang.  A Methodological Approach for Conducting a Business Case Analysis for the 
Joint Distance Support and Response (JDSR) Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD), 
Naval Postgraduate School, December 2006. p. 6. 
7 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-234, DOD's High-Risk Areas: Progress 
Made Implementing Supply Chain Management Recommendations, but Full Extent of Improvement 
Unknown.  January 17, 2007.  p. 1. 
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business transformation and strategic logistics planning efforts.8  Later, GAO was asked 
to monitor the progress in the implementation of the DOD’s plan to improve supply chain 
management.  
Released in January 2007, the GAO report concludes that progress in DOD’s 
overall approach to business defense transformation is still needed to confront problems 
supply chain management.  According to the GAO, DOD has focused its efforts towards 
improving supply chain management, but the department lacks the metrics to demonstrate 
the full extent of progress. 
Although DOD faces challenges to developing department wide supply 
chain performance measures, such as the difficulty of obtaining 
standardized, reliable data from non-interoperable systems, without 
outcome-focused performance and cost metrics, it is unclear whether DOD 
is progressing toward meeting its stated goal of improving the provision of 
supplies to the warfighter and improving readiness of equipment while 
reducing or avoiding costs through its supply chain initiatives.9 
In summary, the literature indicates that supply chain management is critical to 
the warfighter and that improvements are necessary in requirements forecasting, asset 
visibility, and materiel distribution.  In the twenty-first century, operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have shown that in order to adequately support the Future Force of the U.S., 
the current supply chain will need to undergo transformation to keep up with the 
operational demands and to be highly responsive, reliable, and visible.  The future supply 
chain must have the capability to deliver products in the right place, at the right time, and 
in the right quantity in an asymmetric warfare environment.   
                                                 
8 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-234, DOD's High-Risk Areas: Progress 
Made Implementing Supply Chain Management Recommendations, but Full Extent of Improvement 
Unknown.  January 17, 2007.  p. 1. 
9 Ibid., p. 4. 
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II. CONCEPT OF MODULARITY TO IMPROVE PROCESSES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
“An advantage of modularization in the private sector is in managing rapid, 
sequential innovation and economies of scale.”10  Economies of scale lead to reduction of 
logistics complexity.  Therefore, modularity can achieve reduction in logistics complexity 
and supply chain costs while incorporating new improving technology and rapid product 
improvement.11  In the 21st Century strategic environment, the concept of modularity is 
essential for flexibility, interoperability, and efficiency.  Strategic management of 
supplies and distribution channels now recognizes the importance of modularity and 
systems integration in the structure of supply chains to optimize operational performance 
and maximize efficiency.  Modularity has become a general principle in design of 
products, organizations, and supply chains.  As a result of modularity, distribution 
capabilities of firms are greater than any other time in history with increased accessibility 
and visibility.  
In recent years, suppliers have been drawing attention to the importance of 
flexibility, reliability, and affordability of delivering products to the markets.  
Competition demands that firms become more efficient in their supply chain management 
in order to cut costs and eliminate waste.  Principles such as Lean Six Sigma emphasize 
keeping value-added processes while eliminating those which add no value to the system.  
In this context, there has been a growing interest in modularity as the means to increase 
system efficiency and product availability.  No longer a mere concept written in 
engineering design manuals, modularity is now broad systems principle applicable to a 
wide range of products, processes, and organizations.12 We now live in a modular age.13  
                                                 
10 Aruna Apte.  Spiral Development: A Perspective, Naval Postgraduate School Acquisition Research 
Project Report, June 30, 2005, p. 23. 
11 Ibid., p. 23. 
12 Luis Araujo.  Modularity, Systems Integration, and Supply Chain Leadership, Lancaster University 
Management School.  2006.  p. 2. 
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B. PRINCIPLE OF MODULARITY 
According to the Webster Dictionary, the word “modular” describes a physical 
component which is constructed with standardized units or dimensions for flexibility and 
variety in use.  A modular architecture involves conformity of these physical components 
and allows for linkage and interoperability.  In a supply chain, modularity is synonymous 
with systems integration due to the numerous linkages among different channels of 
distribution.  In the world of integrated logistics, that means that ground, rail, air, and sea 
modes of transportation must all tie in together in order to form a network of connected 
nodes.   
These linkages between different modes of transportation require modularity 
through standardization of shipping containers, container handling equipment, and 
tracking methods in order to achieve economies of scale and homogeneous 
transportation, which results in reduction of logistics complexity and hence reduction of 
cycle time.  Standardization aspect of modularity for shipping containers implies that the 
containers can fit into the cargo space of all types of transportation assets.  By 
considering the dimensions and capacity of the transportation asset, the system is able to 
eliminate the need for repackaging and the time delays associated with the process.  
Modularity also demands that the shipping containers must also be compatible with the 
MHE (Material Handling Equipment).   
The final element of modularity is tracking the containers.  The key to a tracking 
system is visibility, meaning that the tracking system must allow suppliers and customers 
to locate the shipment at every node throughout the supply chain.  This implies that both 
the suppliers and customers have the technology to access the same network.  To allow 
interoperability among the supply chain network, the technology must allow user 
interface for tracking to be easy and reliable.     
 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 R., A. Kumaraswamy Garud and R. Langlois.  Managing in the Modular Age.  Architectures, 
Networks and Organizations.  New York: Blackwell, 2002.  p. 149. 
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1. Benefits of Modularity 
One of the important results of modularity is consistency.  There have been 
empirical studies which support the argument that consistency amongst product, 
processes, and supply chain architectures improves performance.  Supply chain 
consistency is characterized as the degree to which production and distribution are scale-
efficient no matter what the distance of the supplier is from the target market.  High-
volume firms with scale-efficient production and distribution have a high degree of 
consistency and are associated with lower costs.  Empirical results suggest that firms with 
consistency in products, processes, and supply chain outperform those without.14 
2. Critics of Modularity 
The main problem with achieving modularity in a supply chain is that interactions 
between different organizations vary based on design, capabilities, and activities.  The 
interdependencies between these organizations exist but may not be significant.  Each 
organization is an independent node in the network, and there is very little incentive to 
become more interdependent.  In the adoption of modularity, interaction and cooperation 
between different organizations are critical.  To achieve modularity, the interaction of 
organizations at different levels involves significant systems integration capabilities.  In 
many cases, firms do not have the time or the money to invest in such an effort.  On the 
cooperation side, organizations have territorial boundaries which prevent the coordination 
amongst the players within supply chain. 
                                                 
14 Luis Araujo,  Modularity, Systems Integration, and Supply Chain Leadership, Lancaster University 
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III. CIVILIAN MODELS OF SUPPLY MODULARITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the area of supply chain management, global courier operations depend on the 
efficiency of their chains, and two companies are at the forefront when it comes to 
running their operations efficiently: Federal Express (FedEx) and UPS.  With 
technological innovation, UPS and FedEx use modularization to expedite delivery and 
logistics.  They also use tracking to keep the supply visible.  "The information about a 
package is as important as the delivery of the package itself," said FedEx founder 
Frederick Smith in 1979.15   
An examination of their supply chains is valuable for any company involved in 
managing complex logistics and supply chain with fast turnaround times and precise 
deadlines.  Both FedEx and UPS specialize in fast deliveries of letters and packages using 
both air and ground transportation methods.  Their supply chains are highly dependent on 
information technology (IT) systems which allow them to process, track, and deliver the 
parcels with reliability and accountability.  Since IT is critical to their business 
operations, both companies invest highly in the turnover of their technology.  Currently, 
wireless networking and smart tagging using radio frequency identification (RFID) tags 
have been incorporated into their supply chains.  In the last twenty years, FedEx and UPS 
have implemented innovative technologies as they become available in order to improve 
efficiency and customer service.  
B. SUPPLY CHAIN 
Most U.S. companies still face inefficient supply chains according to a survey 
sponsored by UPS.16  As a result, companies are undergoing large capital investments in 
                                                 
15 “Competition takes FedEx and UPS to the forefront of technological innovation,” Rethink IT.  July 
2004.  Last accessed March 13, 2007.  p. 1.  
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PAT/is_2004_July/ai_n6148566. 
16 Ibid., p. 1.  
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synchronizing the entire interaction between vendors, customers and suppliers, not just 
optimizing small components of the process.  For FedEx and UPS, they established this 
synchronicity through modularity and visibility.17  Visibility, which is an essential 
element of an effective supply chain, is the ability to capture and use real time 
information as products move through the supply chain.  By building massive IT 
networks over the last twenty years, FedEx and UPS now possess the capability to track 
the flow of goods throughout the supply chain.18  These large IT networks permit 
transparency of the movement of goods inside their global network.  These IT 
infrastructures support everything from the rapid dispatch of spare parts needed to repair 
customer equipment to the real time transfer of funds as a package is delivered.  
C. EVOLUTION THROUGH TECHNOLOGY 
Through emerging technology, FedEx and UPS plan to reduce the time and 
money required to operate their supply chains.  Modularity is a key element of both 
companies' approaches and both believe implicitly in its ability to reduce their costs, 
improve their efficiency, and increase their customer satisfaction.  Both companies have 
had modular strategies since the late 1980s, based on proprietary containers, platforms, 
and tracking methods.  Now, the latest wireless technologies are allowing modularity in 
visibility. 
FedEx and UPS feel strongly that acceptance and incorporation of commercial 
wireless technologies into their supply chains improves visibility and operations in 
general.  In recent years, both FedEx and UPS have taken advantage of new wireless 
capabilities which have come into the marketplace, including Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular 
networks, GPS satellite location systems, and RFID smart tagging.  All these 
technologies are modular since their construction and operation are standardized, and 
companies can use them in a variety of ways.  For example, FedEx and UPS use various 
wireless data collection devices, which can scan bar codes on envelopes and packages as 
                                                 
17 “Competition takes FedEx and UPS to the forefront of technological innovation,” Rethink IT.  July 
2004.  Last accessed March 13, 2007.  p. 1.  
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PAT/is_2004_July/ai_n6148566. 
18 Ibid., p. 1. 
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well as RFID tags to determine the location and status of the shipments.  These wireless 
data collection devices can maintain the history of shipment from pickup to delivery, and 
they are similar to many web-enabled wireless devices used by the customers.  Through 
cellular phones and PDAs, the customers can access the same information for package 
tracking and drop-off locations.   
FedEx and UPS are among the first international courier and transportation 
companies to adopt wireless technology.  According to Rob Carter, FedEx executive vice 
president and CIO, "Wireless data connectivity is something we've done for many years, 
but we had to provide our own bandwidth and had to develop technology to manage it.”19  
However, wireless technology used in supply chains for pick-ups and deliveries are now 
off-the-shelf commercial technologies.  Both companies feel that this gives them a 
competitive edge since they can concentrate on implementation rather than spending time 
and effort on the development of the technologies.  According to Ken Lacy, UPS CIO, 
"You only have a six-month advantage in this industry.  The technology is not a secret, 
and it's what you do with it.”20 Both companies are now looking at using RFID smart 
tags which have recently been made available in the marketplace.  RFID smart tags 
contain a higher degree of intelligence and make tracking packages easier.   
D. INVESTING IN THE FUTURE 
For the next three to five years, the two companies are spending about $120 
million on wireless, and each company has an annual budget of $1 billion.  Wireless 
technology will continue to be at the forefront for improvements in the future.  For supply 
chain management, wireless technology is the best way to collect the real time data 
necessary to manage their operations.  Modularity standards of wireless have made a 
significant contribution to lowering the total cost of ownership of the systems and making 
them more efficient, especially when they need to be integrated with those of partners 
and customers.  With technology investments in significant improvement of information, 
                                                 
19 “Competition takes FedEx and UPS to the forefront of technological innovation,” Rethink IT.  July 
2004.  Last accessed March 13, 2007.  
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PAT/is_2004_July/ai_n6148566. 
20 Ibid., p. 1.   
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FedEx and UPS continue to improve performance and leverage their supply chains.  
Having accurate data, on-time deliveries, and smooth rapid border crossings, there is 
great return on investment associated with information accuracy in this international 
business.21 
 
                                                 
21 Ann Grackin, “RFID for Consumer/Retail Supply Chains,” ChainLink Research.  March 2004.  p. 5. 
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IV. JMIDS OVERVIEW 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
In this thesis we propose to research the following question: What are the benefits 
gained or efficiencies lost by implementation of the Joint Modular Intermodal 
Distribution System (JMIDS) at the Defense Distribution Depot (DDJC) in San Joaquin, 
California? 
1. Why is It Important? 
On 21 March 2005, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a memorandum stating the 
need for a standardized approach to packaging and containerization (Figure 1).  They felt 
that “common containers would reduce cargo handling which results in faster distribution 
with less in-transit losses.” 22 Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) identified problems in transferring cargo between vehicles of different services.  
For example, cargo going from a docked Navy ship to an Army truck and then driven to 
an Air Force plane can be delayed substantially because of differing cargo regulations 
and container systems.   
Sue C. Payton, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and 
Concepts, reiterated the problem that the current system takes too long: “You can’t 
imagine how long that takes, and how difficult that can be.  Grass grows a lot faster than 
that.”23  At an estimated cost of $27 million, Payton wanted to speed up getting water and 
food to U.S. forces and other DOD customers through the Joint Modular Intermodal 
Distribution System (JMIDS), providing a universal intermodal container system for 
automated handling, storage, and tracking.24 
                                                 
22 U.S. Department of Defense.  Memorandum for the Office of Secretary of Defense, Chairman Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Services, COCOMS, Acquisition Commands, and Agencies.  21 March 2005. 
23 Mark Tarrallo.  “Proof of Concept: Demonstration program puts new technology on a fast track,” 
Government Computer News.  May 22, 2006.  Last accessed December 10, 2006.  
http://www.gcn.com/print/25_13/40776-1.html. 
24 Ibid., p. 1. 
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Figure 1.   JOINT CHIEFS MEMORANDUM. 
 
U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) is pursuing JMIDS in order to 
establish multiple-sized containers that combine build and break down a 20/40-foot ISO 
container or 463L pallet into pallet/module sized loads.  The goal of USTRANSCOM is 
to reduce overall the theater logistics footprint, including retrograde, while 
complementing automated loading, handling, and storage systems.  JMIDS can increase 
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interoperability and interchangeability while maintaining compatibility with current 
transportation modes and common/joint handling equipment.  JMIDS characteristics can 
be described as follows: JMIDS  
• withstands harsh environments 
• has long service life  
• has easy accessibility to contents 
• is collapsible to minimize transport of empty containers 
• has high durability / strength  
As the end-to-end (E2E) strategic distribution process transforms, the Department 
of Defense (DOD) remains focused on modernizing sustainment packaging to allow for 
rapid inter-modal transfer of supplies with minimal repackaging requirements.  The 
JMIDS is an example of such a packaging initiative.25 
2. Addressing the Need 
USTRANSCOM is conducting a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration 
(JCTD), which was approved by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced 
Systems and Concepts.  JCTD consists of Military Utility Assessments (MUAs) for 
evaluation of the JMIDS concept.  These MUAs include the principal scenarios: stability 
and support operations from depots to end users (air, land and sea) and unit deployment 
operations related to a joint warfighting exercise.  One of the locations for an MUA is the 
DDJC at San Joaquin, CA. 
B. JMIDS CONCEPT 
USTRANSCOM is the Combatant Commander (COCOM) sponsor and 
operational manager for the JMIDS program.  USTRANSCOM is supported by two 
deputy operational managers – the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command at Fort 
Lee, Virginia, and the Naval Surface Warfare Center Indian Head, Detachment Earle at 
                                                 
25 United States Army.  Deputy Chief of Staff G-4.  “Modernize Theatre Distribution.” Army 
Logistics.  April 2005.  Last accessed February 12, 2007.  
www.hqda.army.mil/logweb/UpdatedCombinedpapers.pdf. 
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Colts Neck, New Jersey.  The Army’s Armament Research Development and 
Engineering Center at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, is the technical manager and 
transition manager for the effort and provides all of the material and training for the 
demonstration.  Additionally, the JMIDS management team is working through the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense International Programs Office with the United 
Kingdom’s Ministry of Defense to establish JMIDS as a formal Coalition Warfare 
initiative.26 
There are three components that make up the JMIDS: Joint Modular Intermodal 
Container (JMIC), Joint Modular Intermodal Platform (JMIP), and Automated 
Identification Technology (AIT).27 (Figure 2) 
 
 
Figure 2.   Joint Capabilities Demonstration Overview.28 
 
 
                                                 
26 “JMIDS Demonstration.”  DPO Update.  28 September 2006.  Last accessed December 5, 2006.   
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=119440. p. 1. 
27 Ibid., p. 1. 
28 Anna Wojciechowski.  “Joint Standardization Board for Intermodal Equipment.”  Joint Intermodal 
Working Group.  22 May 2006.  Last accessed December 12, 2006.  Slide # 15.  www.dsp.dla.mil/2006-
DSP-conf/Wojciechowski.ppt. 
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JMICs augment the Joint Distribution System through the use of standardized 
interlocking cargo packaging modules which enable fast access, rapid 
assembly/reconfiguration of loads, and eliminate resource intensive cargo handling, and 
may be used to provide more effective distribution from strategic to tactical levels to 
ensure better sustainment out to the point of effect.  JMIPs provide interoperability 
among all modes of commercial and military transportation through a compatible cargo 
platform to include direct access to Air Force aircraft.  The JMIP all-mode capability 
permits the movement of cargo from origin to user without time- and resource-intensive 
handling and reconfiguration.  AIT will be integrated in JMICs and JMIPs to provide In 
Transit Visibility and Total Asset Visibility to improve the situational awareness of 
supply and unit movements.  The JMIDS JCTD will investigate several RFID and 
satellite technologies to include sensitive cargo sensors that monitor temperature and 
shock.29 
Currently, USTRANSCOM is funding assessment of commercial off the shelf, 
modular-type containers and how they stand up within the defense transportation system 
(air, ocean, land) and in the underway replenishment and airdrop delivery systems.  
Containers being used in Phase I and II are: Multi-Use Container (MUC) and Reusable 
Bulk Container (RBC) are in current Navy inventory; P2 Pack is the standard container 
used by Distribution Depot Susquehanna Pennsylvania (DDSP).  All-mode Container 
Delivery System (ACDS) is a lightweight plastic commercial container; Clip-Lok is a 
commercial plywood semi custom (size) container; Uni-pak is commercial fiberboard 
sidewall, plastic base, and cover container.  There is a wide variety of sizes and types of 
modular containers with different attributes.  The goal is to set DOD standards for a 
family of containers. 
For Phase I, USTRANSCOM conducted a unitization demonstration which 
focused on moving supplies in various types of commercial off the shelf (COTS) 
containers in the defense transportation system (Figure 3).  It shipped general supplies 
from DDSP to Second Marine Expeditionary Force (II MEF) in Southwest Asia (SWA) 
                                                 
29 “JMIDS Demonstration.”  DPO Update.  28 September 2006.  Last accessed December 5, 2006.   
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=119440. 
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using COTS containers packed on pure pallet via both Air (on 463L) and Sea (TEU).  
The demonstration used ACDS, RBC, and P220/P230.  An analysis was conducted based 
on the survey results of DDSP and II MEF.30 
 
 
Figure 3.   JMIC Visual Depiction.31 
 
II MEF users (Rear and Forward Deployed) provided limited but favorable 
feedback.  Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) warehouse setup required off line 
processing of all sizes of ACDS due to the current physical setup which is designed for 
48x40 containers.  RBC worked well but weight was an issue.  P230 (DLA standard) was 
the most cost effective for single trip (or limited reuse up to about 5 trips).  In order for 
the containers to be more cost effective, they must be reusable more than 5 trips.32 
                                                 
30 Anna Wojciechowski.  “Joint Standardization Board for Intermodal Equipment.”  Joint Intermodal 
Working Group.  22 May 2006.  Last accessed December 12, 2006.  Slide # 13.  www.dsp.dla.mil/2006-
DSP-conf/Wojciechowski.ppt. 
31 Ibid., Slide # 12.   
32 Ibid., Slide # 13. 
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C. SYSTEM EXPLANATION  
The foundation for JMIDS is the JMIP.  The JMIP, as seen in Figure 4 along with 
8 JMICS, is reconfigurable to allow many different applications.  It also maintains 
compatibility with commercial and industrial container systems in order for the 
Department of Defense to utilize existing infrastructure networks to deliver supplies 
through numerous channels.  At the time of this writing the platform was being 
developed by two companies who are vying for the contract.  Boeing Corporation is 
developing a two piece and a single piece platform.  The two piece platform will break 
down into two identical platforms with an adjustable width from 88 inches to 108 inches 
and will fit in an International Organization for Standardization (ISO) container which is 
either twenty or forty feet long, eight feet wide, and eight and a half feet high.  The JMIP 
is configurable for air, rail, road, and shipboard shipment.  The underside of the platform 
has multiple moving parts that allow the different configurations.  For example, the 
Boeing Modular Intermodal Platform MIP when configured for aerial port operations, the 
sides of the platform extend and the retractable wheels extend in preparation for loading.  
Also, the K-loader skids are extended for use with the Army’s Heavy Expanded Mobility 
Tactical Truck Load Handling System (HEMITT LHS).  The extended side rails on the 
platform allow for the platform to interact with the track system in the C-130 aircraft.  The 
extended wheels allow for the interaction between the platform and the moveable loading 
vehicle.  The Sea Box MIP is configured very similar to the Boeing MIP in all matters except 
where the Boeing MIP has extendable wheels, the Sea Box MIP has and extendable platform 
to allow interaction between the MIP, the moveable loading vehicle, and the aircraft.  These 
various configurations allow the JMIP to be employed in a variety of transportation modes.  
The JMIP will complement and ultimately replace the Container Roll In/Roll Out Platform 
(CROP).33 
Current CROP handling procedures and configurations are well suited for Army, 
Navy and Marine Corps uses.  However, when faced with today’s rapidly changing 
                                                 
33 Anna Wojciechowski.  “Joint Standardization Board for Intermodal Equipment.”  Joint Intermodal 
Working Group.  22 May 2006.  Last accessed December 12, 2006.  Slide # 16.  www.dsp.dla.mil/2006-
DSP-conf/Wojciechowski.ppt. 
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political and military environments, there is a need to move more and more cargo using 
Air Force assets.  The CROP cannot directly adapt to Air Force aircraft footprints.  
Therefore the CROP must be changed to meet these requirements of the differing 
airframes.  “Two methods are available to move a CROP-load of ammunition:  
1. Reconfigure the load from the CROP onto multiple 463L pallets to load onto 
the aircraft, with reconfiguration back onto the CROP.   
2. Moving the CROPs onto triple married 463L pallets.”34 (Figure 4)   
These methods require tremendous amounts of labor and material handling 
equipment (MHE) to accomplish.  These methods also make poor use of the space in the 
aircraft.  It is predicted that the use of the JMIP will result in the following: “...aircraft 
turnaround time will decrease by up to 75%; MHE utilization time will decrease by at 
least 50%; and man-hours per platform will decrease by 55%.35 
 
 
Figure 4.   JMIP.  From Ref 57. 
 
The JMIC accompanies the JMIP   Both containers are intended to transform the 
way logistics is handled within the Department of Defense.  They are completely 
collapsible and will eliminate the need to repackage supplies at intermediate shipping 
                                                 
34 Anna Wojciechowski.  “Joint Standardization Board for Intermodal Equipment.”  Joint Intermodal 
Working Group.  22 May 2006.  Last accessed December 12, 2006.  Slide # 10.  www.dsp.dla.mil/2006-
DSP-conf/Wojciechowski.ppt. 
35 Ibid., Slide #11. 
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nodes.  “JMICs will augment the DTS [Defense Transportation System] through the use 
of standardized cargo packaging modules.  [They] will enable fast access, enhance rapid 
assembly/reconfiguration of loads, and eliminate resource intensive cargo handling.”36  
This reconfiguration capability allows the JMIC to be deployed in a vast array of uses.  
Further, in the Department of Defense’s need to instill a more joint environment, all 
services will be able to use the JMIC to reduce inefficiencies and increase throughput at 
transshipment nodes and deliver the supplies to the end user in a streamlined fashion.  
Some of these uses are as follows:  Standard JMIC (Figure 5); JMIC frame with rigid 
plastic insert (Figure 6); Liquid tank in JMIC frame (Figure 7); and the sealed controlled 
breathing JMIC.  (Figure 8) 
 
Figure 5.   JMIC.  From Ref 57. 
                                                 
36 U.S. Department of Defense.  JMIDS DRAFT JCTD Management Plan.  Version 3.1.  15 June 
2006, p. 2. 
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Figure 6.   JMIC Frame.  From Ref 57. 
 
Figure 7.   Modified JMIC Frame with cargo.  From Ref 57. 
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Figure 8.   Modified JMIC Frame.  From Ref 57. 
 
Figures 5 through 8 demonstrate some of the versatility, due to the modularity and 
standardization that will be delivered by the JMIC.  The standard JMIC (Figure 6) will be 
used for smaller shipments of supplies destined for a common user.  The supplies can be 
packaged in one or multiple JMICS, labeled or identified as a single shipment through the 
use of RFID, and delivered as one unit via interlocking devices that are integrated into the 
JMIC.  While the standard JMIC weighs around 300 pounds empty, it will be capable of 
handling loads up to 3000 pounds.37  
The JMIC frame with rigid plastic insert (Figure 6) will be used for larger single 
pieces of gear or machinery.  The third configuration mentioned, the Liquid Tank 
(Figure 7), can be used for a variety of substances from potable drinking water to 
lubricating liquids for military machinery in the field.  The last configuration show, the 
Sealed Controlled Breathable JMIC (Figure 8) will be used to deliver supplies that 
require constant protection from the weather changes and pressure changes due to altitude 
variations.   
                                                 
37 United States Department of Defense.  JMIDS DRAFT JCTD Management Plan.  Version 3.1.  15 
June 2006.  p. 6. 
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The JMIC is founded on a “building block” concept that will allow smaller 
shipment containers to be connected together, as demonstrated in Figure 5, with other 
shipment containers to conform to the size requirements of current ISO containers or 
Flatracks (Figure 9).38 
 
Figure 9.   Flatracks.  From Ref 57. 
 
Additionally, multiple JMICS can be combined to deliver much larger supplies 
such as projectiles or missiles.  Figure 10 shows three JMICs connected to accept 5 
AMRAAM missiles.  This aspect of the JMIC allows the legacy methods of packaging 
munitions to be replaced by a reusable container that allows for rapid staging and combat 
preparations.   
                                                 
38 United States Department of Defense.  JMIDS DRAFT JCTD Management Plan.  Version 3.1.  15 
June 2006, p. 9. 
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Figure 10.   JMICs with AMRAAM missiles.  From Ref 57. 
 
The JMIC is also completely collapsible.  This offers many benefits to the 
Department of Defense.  One benefit is the reusability of the JMIC.  The container has 
the ability to be used repeatedly.  It can be rebuilt from the collapsed configuration with 
self sustaining parts, thus eliminating the need for repairs or patching with wood 
materials.  Figure 11 shows the JMIC in the collapsed configuration and Figure 12 
displays twelve collapsed JMICs configured for redistribution to other customers.   
 
 
Figure 11.   JMIC Collapsed.  From Ref 57. 
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Figure 12.   12 Collapsed JMICs. From Ref 57. 
 
Another key development in the logistics community is the use of Automated 
Identification Technology (AIT) as mentioned earlier.  The Deputy Under Secretary of 
Defense for Logistics DUSD(L) developed the AIT task force in 1997.  The technologies 
to be used are as follows: Optical Memory Cards (OMC); Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID); Smart Cards paired with the Automated Information Movement System (AIS) 
and the Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES); commercial satellite 
tracking systems.  AIT will be integrated into the JMIDS program and will be the 
cornerstone of shipment tracking.  With the use of AIT, the supplier and the customer 
will have in-transit visibility of their supplies.  Integrating the use of AIT is essential for 
the Department of Defense to reduce inefficiencies in the current supply chain.  39 
D. MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF JMIDS 
1.   Purpose 
Viewing the Joint Modular Intermodal Distribution System (JMIDS) from a 
Management Control System (MCS) framework sheds a different light on the system as a 
whole.  Some insights into processes can be gleaned from this perspective.  The MCS 
                                                 
39 United States Government.  DOD Implementation plan for Logistics Automatic Identification 
Technology.  17 March 2000. p. vi. 
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construct utilizes control methods to achieve desired results within a systems model.  
Regarding the JMIDS model the MCS can be applied to activities and processes to ensure 
the system performs in an acceptable manner.  The general framework that captures the 
major design and use aspects of JMIDS is the results based accountability framework.  
However, in some dimensions of JMIDS, the action based control framework captures 
the major design of some sub-systems.  As acknowledged in the Joint Capabilities 
Technology Demonstration FY-06, the JMIDS advanced concept solution requires, “Joint 
multi-modal/service containers and platforms with integrated asset tracking that permit 
the efficient and seamless movement of supplies through the distribution system to 
include retrograde operations.”40  Some key desired outcomes are highlighted in this 
statement.  First, the system must be efficient and seamless both to the supplier and 
destination nodes.  The supply needs to be shipped and received on time, have minimal 
delays enroute and arrive fully intact.  Second, as the supply is traversing the Defense 
Transportation System (DTS) the carrier personnel must be aware of exactly where the 
supply is going and minimize and anticipate any delays that may occur.  If a delay occurs 
enroute the carrier must be able to transfer the cargo to a more rapid carrier to ensure on 
time delivery.  Finally, once the end state user receives the goods, the JMIC’s and JMIP’s 
must be visible to the supply system for inclusion back into JMIDS or retrograde back to 
the supplier.  Each of these outcomes highlights the need for a results based MCS 
framework.   
2.   Situational Influences 
JMIDS is unique in structure and therefore must be analyzed first from a 
situational influence perspective.  JMIDS by nature is a system that may potentially cross 
many companies, cultures, and nationalities as supplies traverse the system from end to 
end users.  By no means is the system contained within one certain construct.  Therefore, 
recognizing the environmental uncertainty of JMIDS is paramount in deciding what types 
of controls are to be implemented.  As Kenneth Merchant states, “Uncertainty can stem 
                                                 
40 J. R. McDonald.  “Joint Modular Intermodal Distribution System Presentation.”  Joint Capabilities 
Technology Demonstration for FY-06.  March 2006.  Slide 3. 
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from changes (or potential changes) in natural conditions …in the political and economic 
climate, or in the actions of competitors, customers, suppliers (including labor), and 
regulators.”41  Along with these uncertainties comes an unknown amount of risk when 
placing the JMIP in the supply system.  Questions that need to be addressed include “will 
each carrier be familiar with JMIDS, will the automatic identification technology be 
understood on a global level, and will the users have a full grasp of retrograde 
operations?”  As mentioned earlier, the goal of JMIDS is to provide an efficient supply 
system packaging model and network to DOD personnel.  From the MCS perspective if 
the proper controls are put into place much of the environmental uncertainty and risk can 
be mitigated. 
Multinational capability must also be considered when selecting controls for 
JMIDS.  An MCS that is effective for a commercial carrier in the United States may not 
be effective for a foreign carrier.  Different management practices, cultures, and 
nationalities may affect the type of control that needs to be in place for a certain part of 
the system.  For instance, an international transportation company which focuses on 
uncertainty avoidance may respond better to an action control rather than a personnel 
control.  Within the same genre similarities across nationalities need to be incorporated 
into the implementation of controls.  For example in a capitalistic and socialistic culture, 
financial controls will be a good way to gain a desired end result.42  Money can be a 
powerful motivator across the world and must be considered carefully when instituting 
financial controls.  Multinational capability can reduce or enhance efficiency depending 
on the sensitivity to the instituted control. 
3. Management and Control Systems within JMIDS 
While JMIDS is not fully implemented into the DTS, some control problems can 
be recognized and possibly avoided if the correct controls are applied to the system.  One 
problem identified is creating a seamless transportation system across multiple carriers, 
                                                 
41 Kenneth A. Merchant and Wim A Ven der Stede.  Management Control Systems.  England:  
Prentice Hall Financial Times.  p. 588. 
42 Ibid.,  pp.  594-95. 
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nations, and environments enabling a rapid JMIDS structure.  The AIT and RFID 
technology goes a long way in facilitating many of the problems that may arise.  
However, AIT is only as effective as the human element involved with the technology.  
Further, AIT is mainly a passive tracking system.  An active RFID system is in place 
within DTS however the cost of the active RFID transmitters are such that not every 
JMIC or JMIP will be able to be retrofitted with an active RFID tag.43  One of the key 
attributes of JMIDS is the interoperability and intermodalability of JMIC’s and JMIP’s 
with each carrier.  This is to say that when the supplies on the same JMIP need to be 
separated this can be done in an efficient manner by the carrier.  Also if the supplies need 
to be diverted while enroute JMIDS assumes the carrier will know exactly how to handle 
the JMIP.  The problem arises when the carrier is not familiar with JMIDS or does not 
prioritize separating the JMIP from the shipment.  Supplies can literally sit for days until 
the carrier addresses the change in status.  AIT will let the end user know where the 
supplies are located, but will not allow for any inputs to be actively placed into the 
system alerting the carrier.  JMIDS relies heavily on the carrier’s knowledge of the JMIP 
and JMIC.  A control that addresses the end to end user and carrier efficiency needs to be 
implemented within JMIDS. 
Controlling for results appears to be the best fit to facilitate the end to end user 
problem.  Merchant states that results controls are very effective with motivational issues 
within a system.  He continues by saying that there are four steps to be addressed when 
applying results controls.  The four steps include “defining the dimensions on which 
results are desired, measuring performance on those dimensions, setting performance 
targets, and providing rewards or punishment for the behaviors that will lead to the 
desired results.”44  For JMIDS to be successful, each carrier must be motivated to ensure 
that the delay of the JMIP is minimal when traversing the system.  The most effective 
control in this case will be implementing a financial based result control.  A timeframe 
will be given to the carrier for the supplies to reach their next destination.  If the supplies 
                                                 
43 “Radio Frequency Identification.”  Acquisition Community Connection.  5 December 2006.  
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=22423. 
44 Kenneth A. Merchant, and Wim A. Ven der Stede.  Management Control Systems.  England:  
Prentice Hall Financial Times.  Pp Systems.  England:  Prentice Hall Financial Times.  p. 26. 
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are not delivered within that window then the payment for transporting those goods will 
be reduced exponentially as the delay becomes longer.  This will ensure that the carrier 
holds the JMIP as a high priority item and will be actively engaged in the tracking 
process.  If any kind of delay occurs the carrier will transfer the JMIP to another form of 
transportation to ensure the supplies will arrive within the allotted timeframe.  The 
implemented results controls can be related to the result control framework through the 
following steps:  
• Dimension – flexible, intermodal transportation leading to on time 
delivery.   
• Performance measure – timeframe for delivery 
• Performance targets – understanding JMIDS and AIT which will help 
accomplish the first two steps 
• Providing rewards – full payment for delivery of the supplies. 
As with any control a few problems are possible.  First, the financial result control 
chosen places a certain amount of risk on the carrier.  The risk will need to be rewarded 
with a risk premium when the carrier meets the window for delivery.  This MCS assumes 
the financial capital is in place to reward the risk that the carrier is taking with 
transporting the JMIP.  While compensating for risk premiums has not been a traditional 
process within DTS the idea is not outside the realm of fiscal possibility.  Money saved 
through efficiency can be diverted to help pay for the transportation risk premiums.  
Other budgetary options are also available such as programming the premiums into the 
future budgets of end users thus making this MCS a viable option.   
Another problem arises with the variability of environmental factors such as 
weather or other transportation not being available to minimize delays.  These factors are 
often beyond the influence of the carrier and need to be incorporated into the result 
control reward mechanism.  Reducing payment to a carrier due to factors out of their 
control will not be a desired result of the MCS in this instance.  In this case an active AIT 
system will alleviate the problem by notifying the end user of the unavoidable delay.  
AIT might also provide a solution by rerouting another carrier to pick up the JMIP if that 
diversion does not cause delays of supplies.  Despite these potential problems the result 
based financial control is the best fit for JMIDS end to end efficiency. 
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In evaluating the financial result control the tightness is a major factor when 
weighing the risk.  This is to say that the MCS must not only be consistent with the 
reward structure, but also keenly defined and responsive to the results achieved.  One 
solution will be to base the tightness of the control on a variety of factors to include the 
method of transportation, locale, and remoteness of the destination.  Based on the broad 
data from the present global transportation network a matrix can be developed that will 
give insight into the potential risk borne by the carrier.  Again risk will be defined as the 
propensity for delay for any reason.  The tightness of the control will expand or contract 
the delivery window based on the aforementioned factors.  Setting the tightness in this 
manner will allow for risk sharing both by the JMIDS end user and the supply carrier.  
4. Retrograde of JMIP/JMIC 
Another MCS problem with JMIDS is the retrograde capability of the system.  
When the JMIP reaches the end user a system is not in place that will require the JMIP to 
be either placed back into the supply system or collapsed for return to the shipment node.  
AIT again facilitates this issue up to a point.  The supply system can see the JMIP, but 
has no authority as to how rapidly the end user places the containers back into the supply 
system.  With an unlimited amount of JMIP’s this will not be a problem.  However, with 
constrained resources a domino effect can be observed here if each end user is not prompt 
in their actions with the retrograde of the JMIP.  Other supplies will have to wait for 
empty containers to be placed back into the system and the problem will continue to 
escalate.   
Action controls will provide an acceptable solution to ensuring retrograde 
operations occur in a fastidious manner.  Action controls are the most direct form of MCS 
because they ensure that people perform duties in an exact and desired manner.  Action 
accountability holds people accountable for the actions they take.  As with results 
controls four steps are required for proper implementation.  These steps are “defining 
what actions are acceptable, communicating those definitions to employees, observing or 
otherwise tracking what happens, and rewarding good actions or punishing actions that 
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deviate from acceptable.”45  Action controls are able to be implemented in this case 
because the end user will be a member of the DOD and therefore be accountable to 
members of DOD.  JMIDS will have a more considerable amount of influence on the end 
users than with the end to end efficiency problem.  Therefore, action controls will be 
effective if chosen correctly.   
Requiring strict procedures and guidelines for placing JMIPs and JMICs either 
back into the supply system or collapsing them for return is an action control that will be 
effective for retrograde operations.  These procedures will be communicated via AIT.  
AIT will provide the next location for the JMIP and the means by which the JMIP is to be 
shipped to that location.  If AIT directs the end user to collapse and return the JMIP then 
a deadline to do so will be stated.  When the deadlines expire and the containers are not 
rapidly placed back into the supply system, JMIDS will take punitive action against that 
end user.  The punitive action might be administered in a variety of ways.  One form will 
be to impose some kind of supply restriction on the end user until those containers are 
properly transferred.  Another form of punitive action will be to levy a monetary fine on 
the end user for the JMIPs.  The implemented action controls can be related to the action 
control framework by meeting the following criteria: 
• Define acceptable criteria – the placement of the JMIP/JMIC back into the 
supply system either via shipment through DTS carrier or retrograde 
operations. 
• Communicate definitions – AIT will provide instructions to the end user 
as to the desired action to be taken to be determined by JMIDS decision 
nodes. 
• Tracking what happens – AIT will monitor, via tracking device, the 
location of the JMIP/JMIC. 
• Rewarding/Punishing actions – administering restrictions if the AIT 
directions are not followed. 
One of the problems that might arise from this control is that the end user simply 
is not able to meet the requirements of AIT for a variety of valid reasons.  Some 
acceptable criteria for not returning the containers will have to be put in place to avoid 
                                                 
45 Kenneth A. Merchant, and Wim A. Ven der Stede, Management Control Systems.  England:  
Prentice Hall Financial Times.  p. 69. 
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punishing an end user that will not be able to meet the timeframe for placing the 
containers back into JMIDS.  Another problem that might occur with this type of action 
control is potentially punishing the user of the supplies for the actions of the supply 
officer.  This might be alleviated by identifying commanding officers (COs) with 
authority over the supply officers and establishing a line of communication that will give 
those COs the opportunity to remedy the situation before the punishment is enacted.   
The degree of tightness of this control will be subject to the actions of the end 
user.  An evaluation scorecard will be kept at a central database which monitors the 
actions of the end users.  If an end user is very consistent with placing the JMIPs back 
into the supply system then the action control can be loose to a certain degree.  If at some 
point the end user is not able to meet the time requirement their “good behavior” will be 
rewarded by the system granting a degree of slack instead of instant punishment.  Along 
the same lines for an end user that is consistently placing containers back into JMIDS 
after the time requirement, the action control will be tight and punishment will be levied 
immediately.  The degree of tightness will provide some latitude and the control will be 
that much more effective. 
Instituting results and action controls framework within JMIDS will address 
potential gaps in the system and provide more manageability of the components.  Each 
control addresses the situational factors that are present due to the global nature of 
JMIDS.  The degree of rigidity of the controls will produce the desired results as they 
relate to the efficiency of the system and retrograde capability.  Risk sharing is a major 
factor in making JMIDS a successful supply distribution network and must be mitigated 
throughout the system.  Environmental uncertainty and multinationality will be a 
continual monitoring process to ensure the controls are sensitive to the ever changing 
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V. LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS46 
Note:  The following analysis is not based on actual JMIDS data.  This 
data was unavailable to the authors.  Since actual JMIDS data is not 
available, the authors have used notional data to develop and apply an 
approach to the life cycle cost analysis.  The resulting analytical model 
could be used by JMIDS managers or by future researchers to determine 
actual lifecycle costs.  Therefore, all of the following numerical data are 
strictly hypothetical and are solely the views expressed by the authors who 
are portraying the PMO and the technical experts.  Further, the 
percentages applied to the model were based on a Life Cycle Cost 
Analysis of a weapon system.  The authors took those percentages and 
lowered them to reflect the non-technical nature of JMIDS.  Professor 
Greg Mislick at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA has given 
his permission to use this model as a practical application in the LCCA 
for JMIDS.  Thus, we have referenced the material from his class in 
preparing this portion.  
A. LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS OVERVIEW47 
The Department of Defense life cycle cost analysis (LCCA) is a comprehensive 
cost overview of the total cost allocated to a particular system, program, or element over 
the lifetime of that particular entity.  The LCCA is performed and documented in the 
form of a Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD).  The Naval Center for Cost 
Analysis states the following regarding the requirements and implementation of a 
thorough cost analysis. 
DOD Instruction 5000.2 and DOD 5000.2-M (references (a) and (b)) 
require that both a program office estimate (POE) and a DOD Component 
                                                 
46 United States Government.  Department of Defense.  DOD 5000.4-M:  Cost Analysis Guidance and 
Procedures.  December 1992.  10 March 2007.  p. 24. 
47 The complete LCCA breakdown is listed in Appendix A. 
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cost analysis (CCA) estimate be prepared in support of acquisition 
milestone reviews.  As part of this requirement, reference (b) specifies that 
the DOD Component sponsoring an acquisition program establish, as a 
basis for cost-estimating, a description of the salient features of the 
program and of the system being acquired.  This information is presented 
in a Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD).48 
The CARD is a “living” document that can be continually updated when cost 
estimates are revised based on new information, technology, etc.  Defense Acquisition 
Boards are the primary users of the CARD.  The data in the CARD should be concise yet 
clear with regard to costs in each program.49  Any DOD program typically has four main 
cost pools: Research and Development (R&D), Production and Deployment (PD), 
Operating and Support (O&S), and disposal costs.  As can be seen in figure 13 the 
majority of the costs of a typical DOD program can be attributed to the O&S phase of the 
life cycle cost with disposal often negligible in comparison.  This figure does not hold 
true in the JMIDS LCCA.  O&S is not the primary cost element.  A cost estimation 
expert at the Naval Postgraduate School agrees that Operations and Support would not be 
the major cost component within JMIDS,50 because with traditional DOD acquisition 
systems there are large numbers of people who work solely for the purpose of that 
acquisition system.  For example, any given weapon system in the U.S. Navy has specific 
designated personnel assigned to operate and repair that weapon system and if that 
weapon system did not exist, those personnel would not be employed by DOD.  
Consequently, JMIDS will have no personnel directly assigned within the framework of 
any of the U.S. Armed Forces for the purpose of maintaining the JMIDS equipment.  PD 
is actually the most significant cost when applied to the JMIDS cost structure.   
 
                                                 
48 United States Government.  Department of Defense.  DOD 5000.4-M:  Cost Analysis Guidance and 
Procedures.  December 1992.  10 March 2007. p. 8. 
49 Ibid., p. 8.  
50 Daniel Nussbaum.  Professor, Naval Postgraduate School.  Monterey, CA. Personal Interview. 20 
March 2007.  
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Figure 13.   Typical Life Cycle Cost Distribution51 
 
B. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COST ESTIMATION52 
1.   Development Engineering 
The development engineering cost estimation element includes the following: cost 
of the study, analysis, design development, evaluation, testing and redesign of the system 
components.  It includes, but is not limited to the preparation of specifications, 
engineering drawings, parts lists, and report preparations.  Also included are the quality 
assurance costs, cost of the raw materials required, semi-fabricated materiel and 
purchased parts consumed in the course of engineering, the analysis of reliability, and the 
systems maintainability.  The Program Manager’s Office has estimated that it will take 
4 staff years to complete the development engineering phase of the JMIC (WBS01), and 
10 staff years to complete the staff years to complete development engineering phase of 
                                                 
51 United States Government.  Department of Defense.  Operating and Support Cost Estimating 
Guide.  1 May 1992.  Last accessed April 1, 2007.  p. 2-2.  
http://www.ncca.navy.mil/resources/caig_os_guide.pdf. 
52 The complete R&D breakdown can be seen in Appendix B. 
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the JMIP (WBS02).  JMIDS is a strictly experimental technology and has no historical 
cost data that can be used for analysis from previous logistical systems.  The cost of a 
structural and mechanical engineering staff month has be estimated to be roughly $4,000 
(CY06).  (All cost figures from here on will be listed in CY06$.)53   
Table 1 shows that the total Development Engineering costs were calculated by 
multiplying the cost of one staff month by the total number of staff months required to 
complete each WBS.  As is listed, the total estimated cost for the JMIC in the DE phase is 
$192,000.00, and the total cost for the JMIP in the DE phase is $480,000.00 bringing the 
total of the two to $672,000.00.  The justification for the higher overall cost for the JMIP 
is the number of staff years required for completion.  The driving force for the higher 
number of staff years to complete is the requirement for the JMIP to be multi-
configurable.  The JMIP must be able to transition seamlessly between being transported 
by the HEMITT and being loaded into the cargo hold of a C-130.  Further, the JMIP must 
be able to withstand high amounts of stress that will be exerted on it when the locking 
mechanisms are engaged from the transporting vehicle.  The forces that will be exerted 
are from mechanical means.  However, the locking mechanisms for the JMIC will be 
engaged manually by the user and the forces will not be nearly as high.  JMIC standards 
require that they: 
• Define interface to increase interoperability and interchangeability 
• Lifting and tie downs (MIL STD 209 and NATO STANAG 4062) 
• Stackable 
• Locking interfaces 
• Platform size footprint / internal dimensions  
• Compatible with transportation modes 
• Compatible with common/joint handling equipment 
• Withstands harsh environments 
• Service life  
• Accessibility to contents 
                                                 
53 Greg Mislick.  “Life Cycle Cost Analysis.”  Cost Estimation course (OA4702).  Naval Postgraduate 
School. Monterey CA.  p. 3. 
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• Collapsible to minimize transport of empty containers 
• Durability / strength 
• Gross Weight Capacity 54 
The JMIP standards have not yet been codified.  They are projected to be released 
in FY07 therefore the information listed above regarding the JMIP’s transfigurability is  
speculative.      
WBS 01 JMIC 02 JMIP 
PMO (Staff years) 4 10 
Cost per staff month $4,000.00 $4,000.00 
Staff months to complete 48.00 120.00 
 $192,000.00 $480,000.00 
Table 1.   Development Engineering Estimate.  After Ref 61. 
 
2. Producibility, Engineering and Planning (PEP) 
This cost estimation element includes costs that are incurred in assuring an item’s 
producibility.  PEP includes the tasks involved in guaranteeing timely, efficient, and 
economic production of necessary materiel and is essentially of a planning nature.  Some 
examples of costs in this section are quality assurance plans, special production 
processes, dimensional and tolerance information, and all data and calculations necessary 
to ensure the equipment works as promised.55  The costs associated with PEP were 
calculated by taking an arbitrary percentage of the combined total of Prototype 
Manufacturing and Development Engineering.  This method is common among 
acquisition and cost estimation professionals.56  The percentage chosen for this project 
was 6%.  This figured was based on the fact that JMIDS is a “dumb” system and one that 
is not technical in nature.  Other systems, such as weapons or software, usually have a 
                                                 
54 Anna Wojciechowski.  “Joint Standardization Board for Intermodal Equipment.”  Joint Intermodal 
Working Group.  22 May 2006.  Last accessed March 5, 2006.  Slide 10.  www.dsp.dla.mil/2006-DSP-
conf/Wojciechowski.ppt. 
55 Greg Mislick.  “Life Cycle Cost Analysis.”  Cost Estimation course (OA4702),  Naval Postgraduate 
School.  Monterey, CA. p. 2. 
56 Ibid., p. 3. 
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much higher percentage applied in this section.  Therefore, by taking 6% of the PM and 
DE costs for the JMIC we arrived at a PEP cost of $128,443.  And the 6% PEP costs for 
the JMIP is $39,969.    
3. Tooling 
Technical experts estimate that tooling costs will be about 16%, of the prototype 
manufacturing costs for each, the JMIC and JMIP.  They arrived at this cost by looking at 
a more sophisticated system and downgrading the percentage based on the low technical 
nature of JMIDS as compared to the more technical system.  The tooling costs totaled 
$341,580 which breaks down to $311,795 for the JMIC and $29,785 for the JMIP. 
4. Prototype Manufacturing 
The PMO has determined that the program will require 10 JMIPs and 500 JMICs.  
These Containers and Platforms will be dispersed at the participating Limited Military 
Utility Assessment (LMUA) locations.  This will afford the operating personnel the 
opportunity to become familiar with the configurability of the JMIC.  The breakdown is 
as follows57: 
JMIP Demonstration Phase Hardware Required: 
1 JMIP (1 piece or 2 piece) 
 
LMUA 1A-D Hardware Required:  
JMICs 28 (2 Train-up, 8 floor loaded in ISO, 8 on 
JMIP in ISO, 10 in Commercial Truck) 
JMIPs 1 (Either 1-Piece or 2-Piece JMIP will be 
sufficient) 
   
  LMUA 1E-G Hardware Required: 
 JMICs 42 (2 Train-up, 16 loaded in ISO, 8 on 463Ls, 16 in 
Dedicated Truck) 
JMIPs 1 (To function efficiently the 2-Piece JMIP will be required) 
   
  LMUA 2A-C Hardware Required: 
 JMICs 120 (24 Bomb JMICs, 32 Bomb component JMICs, 32 
Artillery JMICs, 32 Small Ordnance JMICs) 
                                                 
57 Chris Allen.  “Joint Modular Intermodal Distribution System.”  USTRANSCOM Power Point 
Presentation.  6 April 2006. Slide 15. 
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JMIPs 0  
   
  LMUA 2D-E Hardware Required: 
   JMICs 56 (24 Bomb JMICs, 32 Bomb component JMICs) 
JMIPs  0   
   
  Capstone MUA (TALISMAN SABRE-07) Hardware Required: 
JMICs 164 (64 for transport on JMIP, 80 for Seabase, 20 for air 
transport) 
JMIPs 3 (3 JMIPs for use w/the US Army LHS Trucks (Model 
TBD) 
   
  Coalition Warfare Demo Hardware Required: 
   JMICs 16  
   JMIPs 1  
Configuration issues associated with the Container and the Platform will 
hopefully be eliminated during this assessment period.  The issues include but are not 
limited to the connecting of two or more Containers to accommodate larger weapons or 
machinery.  To estimate the costs associated with Prototype Manufacturing, Cumulative 
Average Theory was used because most of the following holds true.   
[The containers in question will be] used in situations 
where the initial production of an item is expected to have 
large variations in cost due to: 
• use of “soft” or prototype tooling 
• inadequate supplier base established 
• early design changes 
• short lead times 
This theory is preferred in these situations because the 
effect of averaging the production costs “smoothes out” 
initial cost variations.58   
The equation and process used for Cumulative Average Theory is stated as and is:
 Defined by the equation YN = AN b where 
YN =  the average cost of N units 
                                                 
58 Greg Mislick.  “Learning Curves.”  Power Point Presentation.  Cost Estimation OA 4702.  Naval 
Postgraduate School.  Monterey, CA.  Slide 29. 
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A =  the theoretical cost of unit 1 
N =  the cumulative number of units produce 
b =  a constant representing the slope (2b) 59 
The costs for the Prototype Manufacturing section are shown in Figure 14.  The 
costs are broken down into sections by WBS.  The JMIC has a theoretical first unit cost 
of $10,000 (purely arbitrary but was chosen relatively low considering the fact that it is 
simply a mechanical piece of equipment and not a highly sophisticated and technological 
piece of electronic gear).  Using the lot costs for the prototype gear, the totals for the 
JMIC come to roughly $1.95M with an average cost of $3,179.  The learning curve for 
the JMIC is estimated to be 88%.  The JMIP on the other hand has a learning curve of 
91%.  The costs for the JMIP are considerably higher per unit.  At an average unit cost of 
$16,082, the Platform is about five times the cost of the JMIC.  This higher cost is again 
explained by the stressful nature and the vast array of configurations needed to be 
accomplished by the Platform.  The total lot cost for the Platform prototype gear is 
roughly $186,000.  This is relatively low compared to the Containers lot cost, however, 
we are only producing 10 Platforms as opposed to 500 Containers.  All of the calculations 
dealing with the PM costs were derived by using the formula in Figure 14.  The variables 
for the equation in Figure 14 have the same description as the variables in Table 2.   
 
WBS 01 JMIC 02 JMIP 
Prototype Manufacturing (CTn) $1,948,720.19 $186,156.55 
Theoretical First Unit Cost (A) $10,000.00 $22,000.00 
Learning Curve 0.88 0.91 
Prototypes produced(n) 500 10 
Average cost per unit (Y 500/10) $3,178.66 $16,082.78 
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Figure 14.   Total Lot Cost Equation.  From Ref 60. 
 
5.  System Engineering/Program Management 
All of the costs associated with the JMIDS in this section are linked to WBS03 
(other).  Sunk costs are routinely accounted for in this section though our research has not 
led us to any contractor prepaid expenses for JMIDS.  Since costs in this section are 
completely unknown, we estimate that the System Engineering and Program 
Management phase will be around 12% of the Prototype Manufacturing and 
Development Engineering costs as well as the contractor portion of the System Test and 
Evaluation.60  This 12% comes out to $504,000 for JMIDs.   
6. System Test and Evaluation  
The PM has asked for a total of $3.0M for the Test and Evaluation of JMIDs.  Of 
this $3.0M, $1.6M is allocated to the government and $1.4M to the contractor.  These 
costs include but are not limited to the travel and associated expenses for the engineers 
doing the assessments.  Also included are the costs for the other personnel involved in 
completing the tests i.e. military and civilian personnel at each LMUA site that is directly 
involved with the testing of any JMIDs item. 
7. Training 
All costs in this section are grouped with the WBS03 (other) and are explained by 
Table 3.  This category includes the cost of development of services, devices, accessories 
and training aids.  Also included is the software and parts used to facilitate instructions by 
which personnel are trained to have sufficient skills in order to operate and maintain the 
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system.61  The PM and Technical Experts have laid out training plan that involves 
maintenance and configuration field training.  Along with this they have hired a graphics 
designer to develop a course demonstration video to accompany the students upon 
completion for future reference and on the job training.  It was estimated that the 
development of the training course will require two Field Technical trainers, one 
Graphics Designer, and one Supervisor.  Salaries for the different positions are based on 
generalizations gleaned from their respective fields.62  The hours required for each is 
detailed in Table 3.  The total cost for the training section is $8,450.   
 
 Training hours per trainer   
Training for JMIC and JMIP Field Technical Trainer Graphics Designer Supervisor Total Cost 
          
Training Course Development (Hrs) 20 50 15   
Configuration Field Training (Hrs) 20 0 20   
Maintenance Field Training (Hrs) 10 0 10   
Total Hours 50 50 45   
Cost per hour $40.00 $35.00 $60.00   
Number of personnel in category 2 1 1   
Total Cost $4,000.00 $1750.00 $2700.00  $8,450.00  
Table 3.   Training Cost Table.  After Ref 61. 
 
8.  Risk 
“This section identifies the program manager's assessment of the program and the 
measures being taken or planned to reduce those risks.  Relevant sources of risk include: 
design concept, technology development, test requirements, schedule, acquisition 
strategy, funding availability, contract stability, or any other aspect that might cause a 
significant deviation from the planned program.  Any related external technology 
programs (planned or on-going) should be identified, their potential contribution to the 
program described, and their funding prospects and potential for success assessed.  This 
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section should identify these risks for each acquisition phase (DEM/VAL, EMD, 
production and deployment, and O&S).”63  Taking all of the above factors into 
consideration, the technical experts estimate the risk factors to be 2% and 3.5% for the 
JMIC and JMIP respectively.  These percentages are applied to the total of the 
Development Engineering, PEP, Tooling, and Prototype Manufacturing.  Therefore the 
total Risk costs estimated for JMIDs is $77,376 and is broken down as $51,619 for the 
JMIC and $25,756 for the JMIP.   
C.  PRODUCTION COST ESTIMATION64 
1.   Nonrecurring Production 
a.  Initial Production Facilities 
Cost for initial production facilities are estimated by the contractor along 
with the program manager.  In the case of JMIDs, we estimate that the amount for initial 
production facilities will be minimal based on an existing and reprogrammable 
infrastructure.  The majority of the costs associated with the section deal with retooling 
and reprogramming machinery.  The program manager and contractor estimate these 
costs to be $1.5M for the JMIP (WBS02) and $800,000 for the JMIC (WBS01).    
b.   Other Nonrecurring Production   
All costs in this section are attributable to WBS03 (other).  We concluded 
that our cost factors for this section should be constant with commonly used cost factors 
used in acquiring other DOD systems.  The costs for Nonrecurring Production are derived 
by taking the product of Training costs and the Nonrecurring Manufacturing factor.  
 
 
                                                 
63 United States Government.  Department of Defense.  DOD 5000.4-M:  Cost Analysis Guidance and 
Procedures.  December 1992.  p. 17. 
64 The complete production breakdown can be seen in Appendix C. 
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2.   Recurring Production 
a.   Manufacturing 
The Program Manager has decided to use the same manufacturer for the 
Container and the Platform.  We have determined that we will need at least 150,000 
JMICs and 7000 JMIPs.  Traditionally the PM Office would use analogous system costs 
and lot size and run a simple regression to determine first unit cost.  The assumptions are 
that JMIDs is brand new and there is no analogous systems exist to use in estimating first 
unit costs.  Therefore, the PM has used a step down factor of 29% of the AUC used in the 
Prototype Manufacturing Phase.  This leaves 71% of the PM cost to be used as the first 
unit cost (T1) in the manufacturing phase.  This comes out to be $2,256 for the JMIC and 
$11,418.  We are maintaining the 87% learning curve for this section.  Applying the total 
cost formula from Figure 15, we come to a total Manufacturing cost of $38.6M for the 
JMIC and $16.8M for the JMIP.  
 
 
Figure 15.   Total Cost Formula.  From Ref 60 
 
Under WBS03, other manufacturing costs are based on contractor 
estimates.  The Program Office will continually update the estimates, but at the current 
time the other manufacturing costs are projected to be $800,000.  This brings total 
Manufacturing Costs to $56.3M.   
b. Recurring Engineering 
All costs in this section fall under WBS03.  “Other costs associated with 
this cost element are the sum of the costs for engineering services and production support 
engineering.” 65  Each of these costs can be calculated by multiplying the appropriate 
factor times the total manufacturing costs.  Once again, we concluded that our cost 
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factors for this section should be constant with commonly used cost factors used in 
acquiring other DOD systems.  Thus, the costs for this section total $2.2M and are listed 
in Appendix C. 
c. Sustaining Tooling 
Sustaining tooling costs are step down costs from the tooling costs in the 
Development Phase.  These costs are calculated on the same traditional DOD step down 
percentage.66 This cost is estimated as 50% of the costs in the DE Tooling phase.  This 
comes to $155,897 for the JMIC and $14,892 for the JMIP for a total of $177,790.   
d.    Quality Control 
Quality control costs are calculated by the taking the respective 
manufacturing costs for each product and multiplying them time by the quality control 
factor.  For the JMIC, this comes to $1.15M, and for the JMIP it comes to $506,658 for a 
total of $1.66M 
3.   Engineering Changes   
Costs for the JMIC and JMIP are equal to the respective costs times the 
Engineering Change Order factor.67 This totals $1.66M which is broken down exactly the 
same as the Quality Control section due to the factors being the same.  
4.   Training  
Theses costs will not be material because the training containers will have been 
produced during the Research and Development.  This section is therefore not applicable 
because there are no extra costs associated with the production of containers designed 
specifically for training. 
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67  Ibid., p. 5. 
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5.   Initial Spares-Repairables (ISR) 
The costs associated with this section fall under WBS01 and WBS02 and are 
equal to their respective manufacturing costs times the initial spares factor.68  This brings 
the total ISR cost to $7.2M.  This breaks down to $5M for the JMIC and $2.2M for the 
JMIP. 
D.   OPERATING AND SUPPORT COST ESTIMATION69 
As stated earlier the O&S portion of the JMIDS system is not the most substantial 
cost element in the LCCA.  This is due to the fact that virtually no personnel positions 
will be created specifically for JMIDS which is a requirement of the CARD in order to 
qualify as a cost for any program.  The defense distribution system will have all of the 
personnel in place through the existing transportation structure and can be classified as a 
sunk cost and therefore not applicable to the Life Cycle Cost of JMIDS.  Further the 
maintenance of the system will not be material in nature when compared to the R&D and 
PD costs.  Following the PD phase of the LCCA, the JMIDS system will be ready for 
implementation.  The AIT will already be actively engaged in the system and simply 
transferred from the palletized platforms to the new containers.  The two main categories 
of the O&S cost WBS for JMIDS are maintenance and sustaining support.70 
1. Maintenance 
Maintenance can be broken down into two categories to include intermediate and 
depot level.  According to the CARD, intermediate maintenance is classified as, “Labor, 
material, and other costs expended by designated activities and/or units (third and fourth 
echelons) performed external to the unit.  This includes calibration, repair and 
replacement of parts, components or assemblies and technical assistance to the mission 
                                                 
68  Greg Mislick.  “Life Cycle Cost Analysis.”  Cost Estimation OA 4702.  Naval Postgraduate School.  
Monterey, CA, p. 6. 
69  The complete O&S breakdown can be seen in Appendix D-F. 
70 United States Government.  Department of Defense.  DOD 5000.4-M:  Cost Analysis Guidance and 
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 49
unit.”71  Inventory management control of the JMICs will be a substantial cost element 
for intermediate maintenance.  A large cost factor in O&S will be the non-retrograde 
JMIC containers.  As mentioned earlier in the Management and Control Systems chapter, 
a control will need to be in place to facilitate and “incentivize” not only returning the 
JMIC back into JMIDS, but also properly handling, constructing, and breaking down the 
container.  Even with this control in place costs must be allotted for containers that are 
lost, damaged, or simply not returned via retrograde.  In addition to the inventory control 
the damage and lost parts cost must be allocated over the life of the program.  The depot 
level maintenance of the JMICs will not be as substantial as the JMIPs due to the 
rudimentary construct of the container when compared to the JMIP.  However certain 
circumstances may necessitate the depot level repair of a JMIC container due to heavy 
damage, broken parts, etc.  The intermediate maintenance for the JMIP will consist of 
parts replacement, repair due to mishandling/breakage, and unforeseen failures of 
equipment.  The majority of the maintenance costs for the JMIP will occur in the depot 
level repairs due to the fact that the JMIP is constantly in contact with moving parts of 
carriers and the platform will be continually adjusted to fit the various travel platforms.  
In essence the overall maintenance picture for the JMIDS system is significant but not a 
substantial part of the overall costing of the system.  
A common practice in the cost estimation community is to cost the maintenance 
of a product as a percentage of the production or procurement cost.  In order to cost the 
system for the JMICs and JMIPs the numbers of containers and platforms in the system 
must be identified.  Based on an arbitrary incremental procurement cycle and life cycle 
timeframe of 20 years, the costs can be accurately captured and are displayed in appendix 
E and F.  To cost JIMDS, we began by taking the average production costs per JMIC, 
which totaled around $257.00 per container.  We then took one half of one percent of the 
per MIC average production costs to calculate the annual repair cost per container.  This 
comes to roughly $193,000 by year 2011 which is when the full compliment of 150,000 
JMICs will be in the logistical system.  The total repair costs over the 20 year lifecycle 
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sums to $3.4M for the JMIC.  We conducted a similar costing for the JMIP by taking one 
quarter of one percent of the per MIP average production costs.  The average production 
costs for the JMIP came out to $2400.  Taking one quarter of one percent of the $2400 
came out to a total of $42,000 by year 2011.  Again, looking at the total cost after the 20-
year lifecycle we came up with $755,000 dollars for the repair costs for the JMIP.    
2.   Sustaining and Support 
According to the CARD, Sustaining and Support is described as, “Procurement 
(exclusive of war readiness materiel) of replacement support equipment, modification 
kits, sustaining engineering, software maintenance support, and simulator operations 
provided for a defense system.”72  In figuring the Sustaining and Support costs, we 
determined that the replacement factor for the JMIC would be 1% and the replacement 
factor for the JMIP would be 0.5%.  These replacement factors when applied bring the 
total JMICs that need to be replaced in 2011 to 1,500 and 35 for the JMIP.  These 
replacements will be necessary due to lost control of inventory.  These total replacement 
costs sum to $386,000 for the JMIC and $84,000 for the JMIP.  These costs will also 
carry forward through the lifecycle of the program.  Next we calculated the sustaining 
support cost by taking 3% of the repair and replacement added together.  The repair and 
replacement costs total $579,000 in 2011 for the JMIC.  Taking 3% of the total we came 
up with $17,388 for the sustaining costs per year from 2011 on.  After the 20 year 
lifecycle, the total sustaining costs for the JMIC are $311,000.  For the JMIP, we used the 
same calculations to figure sustaining costs with one exception.  We took 5% of the 
totaled repair and replacement costs and came to a total of $6,300 per year from 2011 on.  
This brings the total sustaining lifecycle costs to $113,364.  The increase in the 
percentage in this section is due to the more technical nature of the JMIP as compared to 
the JMIC.  The JMIP has many more moving parts and is therefore more prone to 
needing upgrades and possible modifications.  After considering all of the factors 
associated with the Operations and Support section of the analysis, we arrived at a total 
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O&S cost of $13.067M which breaks down to $10.6M for the JMIC and $2.4M for the 
JMIP.  Again, a full breakdown of these costs is listed in Appendix E and F. 
As discussed above a steady state logistics operation during peacetime.  All of the 
containers would remain within the confines of the DOD’s logistics management control.  
Meaning the tracking and control of every container, save the replacement factors for 
each, is possible.  However, when tensions heat up outside of U.S. borders and troops 
must be deployed, the establishment of forward operating areas takes tremendous 
resources to accomplish.  Table 4 breaks down the replacement costs if JMIDS were used 
in this capacity. We propose that the replacement factor has the potential to rise to about 
50%.  What this means is that during the force buildup in the campaign region, as many 
as 50,000 JMICs (arbitrary) would be needed to establish the area of operations.  Taking 
a conservative replacement factor and calculating lost costs due to replacement, the total 
cost is about $6.44M.  What that means is that upon operation execution, the DOD would 
likely lose almost $6.5M worth of containers.  Once the initial buildup is complete, we 
estimate that the number of containers being sent to the war zones or operating regions 
will be around 10,000 containers per year in order to support the operation.   Of those, we 
expect that the replacement factor would be around 25%.  This, in terms of a dollar 
figure, comes to about $644,000 per year in lost containers.    The reasoning behind this 
is one of an economic nature: a trade deficit.   When a force build is ordered, the 
logistical systems within the Armed Services rolls into action and begins flooding the 
battlespace with needed supplies and machinery to carry out the operation.  Recent 
articles on trade between the United States and China allude to the fact that it is cheaper 
for China to build new ISO containers than pay to ship empty ISO containers back from 
the U.S., thus consuming valuable cargo space on large container ships.73  This is exactly 
the situation faced by logistics personnel during a time of force buildup.  There is no 
immediate concern for the return of the shipping containers during the massive export of 
supplies and equipment from U.S. soil to the foreign operating region.  However, when  
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 52
the dust settles and the fighting is deemed finished, the amount of supplies and machinery 
that went into the battlespace does not even come close to that which needs to be 
removed.  










Steady State JMICs  150,000 $3,864,172.91$9,660,432.28 $19,320,864.55 
Initial Wartime Need  50,000 $1,288,057.64$3,220,144.09 $6,440,288.18 
Wartime Sustainment (JMIC/Yr) 10,000 $257,611.53 $644,028.82 $1,288,057.64 
Cost Per JMIC $257.61    
Table 4.   JMIC Wartime Replacement Estimates.  After Ref 61. 
 
With all of the analysis to the Life Cycle Cost of the Joint Intermodal Distribution 
System that is mentioned above, the authors have determined the overall cost for the 
system to be $91.6M in calendar year 2006.  Of the $91.6M total cost, roughly 80% 
comes from the Production section of the program and comes to roughly $71M.  Looking 
at Table 4, it is not advisable to take JMIDS much further without some thought on the 
potential for lost containers.  On a conservative estimate, it is possible to spend about 
$4M per year to keep the inventory of JMICS at the 150,000 level.  However, a more 
liberal estimate brings the replacement cost up to about $20M to maintain the required 
number of JMICS in service.    
It is the opinion of the authors that the JMIDS program is heading in the wrong 
direction based on the dollar figures derived in this analysis.  The main item that led to 
this conclusion is the high potential for loss of the JIMCS.  The authors feel that JMIDS 
would be successful if used as a possible “InterNodal” Distribution System rather than a 
one size fits all solution.  Further, while JMIDS could be used as the primary shipping 
method from major shipping node to major shipping node, it is recommended that an 
alternate and more economical mode of shipping be used for the last mile of the 
shipment.   
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
To completely analyze JMIDS we first gained an understanding of the system by 
reviewing the current literature of modularity.  Next, we took a step back and reviewed 
the concept of modularity noting the proponents and critics of the concept.  Then, we 
reviewed some civilian models of modularity and how those systems provided 
efficiencies to users.  We also took a detailed look at the current concept and design of 
JMIDS to include the concept, explanation, and management and control of the system.  
Finally, we conducted a notional cost estimation of the current project and provided a 
model for future research and cost analysis.   
The concept of modularity has the potential to increase efficiency of a supply 
chain through uniform modular containers that will reduce handling.  However, the 
current construct for an intermodal container in JMIDS poses many hurdles to overcome 
in creating a successful and efficient supply chain.  While conceptually strong, a new 
avenue must be taken in making JMIDS a reality.  The management and control of a 
containerized framework presents significant problems of retrograde especially in a 
wartime scenario.  The potential for waste, damage, and loss creates a fiscal pitfall which 
will need to be addressed in a more tightly controlled system analysis.  Therefore, while 
developing a new container system may be a way forward in the future the current 
communication and tracking network must first be standardized in order to gain end to 
end efficiency.  Once this is accomplished, a system such as JMIDS could possibly be a 
way forward.  While conceptually strong, a new avenue must be taken in making JMIDS 
a reality.   
DOD planners thought that “JMIDS [would] permit efficient, seamless, and 
visible movement of supplies through the distribution system from CONUS-based depots 
and vendor locations to tactical end users, including movement through the Seabase to 
support forward operating expeditionary and task force units.”74  However, we have 
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determined that JMIDS does not permit efficient containerization of supplies nor does it 
solve the problem faced by the DOD’s supply chain.  According to research conducted on 
the current legacy supply system the efficiency problem of the military supply chain lies 
not in the containers themselves but in the operation of the distribution centers, linkages 
between the various supply chain nodes, and tracking throughout the supply chain.75  
Poor communication between different transportation nodes, the lack of a standardized 
tracking system used by commercial firms like FedEx or UPS, and redundancy all 
contribute to the current delays in moving supplies within the DTS.  Though we 
understand that total standardization like the commercial carriers may be an impossible 
task, it would be essential for cost reduction and efficiency to standardize for the bulk of 
the commodities. 
On our visits to the Defense Distribution Depot at San Joaquin (DDJC), our team 
noted that the system which is currently in place runs extremely efficiently, as confirmed 
by the numerous regional and national awards earned by DDJC.  When we spoke with 
personnel at DDJC, they indicated that the initial testing of the JMIDS containers 
hampered their operations.  Problems noted by DDJC personnel included that the JMIC 
was difficult to handle based on its heavy weight and metallic composition.  The test 
container had an empty weight of 329 pounds, and in its empty configuration, the 
container required four personnel to move it, which means that only MHE can feasibly 
move the container.  Also, the design of the container calls for a collapsible and 
reconfigurable container.  During the testing, personnel at DDJC did not find the 
prototype easily configurable and noted that simply configuring the JMIC into the 
standard container created a slowdown in the system.  Numerous safety concerns were 
noted and it was revealed that the JMIC is not user friendly.76  If the distribution center is 
having problems with the container, it is highly likely that these same problems would 
manifest at the intermediate and end user nodes as well. 
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76 Interview with DDJC personnel 15 February 2007.   
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Other considerations are at hand with the implementation of JMIDS.  With the 
current system, the wooden pallets that are in use are disposable, to a point.  They will be 
used for the useful life and then sold to a wholesaler who repairs them and resells them. 
To fix a wooden pallet, the requirements are pieces of wood and nails which are 
inexpensive and quickly accessible. However, with JMIDS, the DOD owns them and 
they are not easily disposable once they break.  In addition, since the JMIDS containers 
are not easily repairable, replacement and repair costs are higher.  As noted in the LCCA 
the repair of a JMIC or JMIP would require substantially more money and assets for 
repair as compared to wooden pallets.  
With JMIDS the economic theory of the Tragedy of the Commons also comes 
into play.  Aristotle said “…that which is common to the greatest number has the least 
care bestowed upon it.”77  What this means is that when the container or platform is 
introduced to the logistical pipeline, it is common to everyone and yet no one really owns 
it.  No one is essentially held accountable for the containers and the end user at the 
Forward Operating Bases bears no responsibility and does not care about returning the 
containers to the distribution centers.  According to DDJC, units in combat zones could 
easily use the JMICs as lockable storage containers because they have no incentive to 
return them.   
Therefore, at a time of crisis or war, all JMICs or JMIPs introduced into the 
theater of operations may or may not be returned for reuse or for repair.  The difficulty of 
storing and managing literally hundreds of metal containers presents a logistical 
nightmare for the supply chain.  No longer would the wooden pallets be easily broken 
down, but heavy metal containers would need to be tracked and sent back through the 
supply system.  No incentive exists for soldiers and units in the combat zones to return 
the containers.  As a result, more containers will have to be manufactured, causing 
JMIDS program costs to spiral out of control.   
Another item of concern is the management of the JMIDS inventory.  Part of the 
Operations and Support cost estimation includes the maintenance, unit level 
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consumption, and inventory and management control.  With JMIDS, how would one 
manage an inventory that they have very little control over?  This problem can be 
compared to that of a trade deficit between countries like the U.S. and China.  When the 
U.S. imports more Chinese goods than it exports to China, the shipping containers pile up 
at the shipyards or railroad depots as is the case at the Port of Los Angeles where yards 
are full of ISO shipping containers.78  This scenario is comparable to the logistics 
operations during a time of conflict or war where the U.S. ships considerably more into 
the combat zone than is shipped out.  Thus, the shipping containers will begin to 
stockpile in the region.  A solution to this problem would be to create logistical personnel 
positions that have the primary duty of managing the JMIDS inventory.  Yet to make this 
solution a feasible one, there would need to be JMIDS inventory personnel sent to the 
front lines for the sole purpose of making sure the containers are sent back.  However, as 
noted in the LCCA no dedicated personnel positions have been planned under the current 
construct and thus the inventory management is left to the supply system. 
Based on our observations and analysis in order to improve the current military 
supply chain, our recommendations are as follows.  First, other distribution centers 
should follow the example of DDJC, which has won numerous awards, by implementing 
continuous improvements through the application of Lean Six Sigma.  Secondly, the lines 
of communication between different transportation nodes within the supply chain must be 
improved.  For example, if a shipment is priority and urgent, then the rule of holding the 
supplies until the trucks and planes are full should be waived.  Last but not the least, the 
tracking system must be standardized in terms of hardware and software in order to gain 
better visibility.  Once the current supply chain inefficiencies are corrected we would 
then recommend looking at a standard container.  To improve the concept of JMIDS we 
recommend designing a common container with the end user in mind.  We believe that 
the current JMIC was designed to be a “jack of all trades and master of none.”  The DTS 
requires that no one JMIC be designed for every possible load, delivery method, or 
configuration.  The designers should look at common supplies and tailor a reconfigurable 
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container for those supplies at a much lower cost and weight.  The JMIC may not be the 
end-all solution.  Another option would be to modify the current JMIP so that it may 
carry the current wooden pallets across multiple carriers to the end user.  The end-goal is 
to create a user friendly intermodal system with minimal logistical and maintenance 
requirement from the end user. 
Areas for future research would include taking the LCCA of this report and 
conducting a cost estimate with the actual data when available.  From the LCCA with the 
real numbers a more feasible and cost friendly system could be designed and 
implemented into DTS.  Also an analysis of node to node pallet use and breakdown 
methods would be useful to truly gain an appreciation of the inefficiencies in the current 
DOD supply system.  As of the writing of this thesis a truly intermodal and efficient 
container system appears unattainable under the current supply system construct.  
The authors cannot recommend that JMIDS go forward.  It is plausible that this 
model is off by a factor of 10 percent or so.  That being said, $91.6M is very small in 
contrast to the overall DOD budget of over $600B.  However, this is still real money and 
should be treated as such and given the same scrutiny as a billion dollar program.  If in 
the future actual data is made available, future research should be done and applied to this 
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APPENDIX A: JMIDS LIFE CYCLE COST TABLE 
All costs in CY06$ 01 JMIC 02 JMIP 03 Other Total Cost
R&D 2,632,577.81$          761,667.88$          3,513,275.21$          6,907,520.90$           
Production 46,939,555.25$        21,612,355.81$     3,053,214.15$          71,605,125.22$         
O&S 10,686,563.39$        2,380,662.75$       13,067,226.14$         
Total Cost 60,258,696.46$        24,754,686.44$     6,566,489.36$          91,579,872.25$         
R&D CY06$
Cost Element 01 JMIC 02 JMIP 03 Other Total Cost
1.0 R&D Totals 2,632,577.81$          761,667.88$          3,513,275.21$          6,907,520.90$           
1.01 Development Engineering 192,000.00$             480,000.00$          672,000.00$              
1.02 PEP 128,443.21$             39,969.39$            168,412.60$              
1.03 Tooling 311,795.23$             29,785.05$            341,580.28$              
1.04 Prototype Manufacturing 1,948,720.19$          186,156.55$          2,134,876.75$           
1.05
System Engineering/   
Program Management 504,825.21$             504,825.21$              
1.06 System T&E 3,000,000.00$          3,000,000.00$           
1.07 Training 8,450.00$                 8,450.00$                  
1.08 Risk 51,619.17$               25,756.88$            77,376.06$                
Production CY06$
Cost Element 01 JMIC 02 JMIP 03 Other Total Cost
2.0 Production Totals 46,939,555.25$        21,612,355.81$     3,053,214.15$          71,605,125.22$         
2.01 Non-recurring production 800,000.00$             1,500,000.00$       2,300,000.00$           
2.011 Initial Production Facilities 800,000.00$             1,500,000.00$       2,300,000.00$           
2.012 Other Non-recurring Prod -$                           
2.02 Recurring prod 39,956,878.60$        17,410,175.87$     3,053,214.15$          60,420,268.62$         
2.021 Manufacturing 38,641,729.11$        16,888,624.61$     800,000.00$             56,330,353.72$         
2.022 Recurring Engineering 2,253,214.15$          2,253,214.15$           
2.023 Sustaining Tooling 155,897.62$             14,892.52$            170,790.14$              
2.024 Quality Control 1,159,251.87$          506,658.74$          1,665,910.61$           
2.03 Engineering Changes 1,159,251.87$          506,658.74$          1,665,910.61$           
2.04 Training N/A -$                           
2.05 Initial Spares Reparables 5,023,424.78$          2,195,521.20$       7,218,945.98$           
O&S CY06$
Cost Element 01 JMIC 02 JMIP 03 Other Total Cost
3.0 O&S Totals 10,686,563.39$        2,380,662.75$       13,067,226.14$         
3.1
Military Personnel Dir Fund 
Elements N/A N/A N/A
3.2 O&M Funded Elements 10,686,563.39$        2,380,662.75$       
3.21 Annual Repair Cost 3,458,434.76$          755,765.95$          
3.22 Replacement Cost 6,916,869.51$          1,511,531.90$       





































APPENDIX B:   R&D LIFE CYCLE COST TABLE 
R&D CY06$
Cost Element 01 JMIC 02 JMIP 03 Other Total Cost
1.0 R&D Totals 2,632,577.81$       761,667.88$         3,513,275.21$      3,907,520.90$      
1.01 Development Engineering 192,000.00$          480,000.00$         672,000.00$         
PMO (Staff years) 4                            10                         
Cost per staff month 4,000$                   4,000$                  
Staff months to complete 48                          120                       
192,000.00$          480,000.00$         
1.02 PEP Totals 128,443.21$          39,969.39$           168,412.60$         
PEP Percentage 6.00%
1.03 Tooling 311,795.23$          29,785.05$           341,580.28$         
Tooling arbitrary percentage 16.0%
1.04 Prototype Manufacturing (CTn) 1,948,720.19$       186,156.55$         2,134,876.75$      
 Theoretical First Unit Cost (A) 10,000.00$            22,000.00$           
Learning Curve 0.88 0.91
Prototypes produced(n) 500 10
JMIC b+1 0.81558                 
JMIP b+1 0.86394                
JMIC (b) (0.18442)               
JMIP (b) (0.13606)              
LN 2 0.69315                
LN slope JMIC (0.12783)               
LN slope JMIP (0.09431)              
Total Cost for respective units 1,948,720.19$       186,156.55$         
Average cost per unit (Y 500) 3,178.66$              16,082.78$           
1.05
System Engineering/Program 
Management CY01 $ 504,825.21$         504,825.21$         
12%
1.06 System T&E 3,000,000.00$      3,000,000.00$      
Contractor 1,400,000.00$      1,400,000.00$      
Gov't 1,600,000.00$      1,600,000.00$      
1.07 Training 8,450.00$             8,450.00$             
Training for JMIC and JMIP Field Technical TrnrGraphics Designer Supervisor   
Training Course Development (Hrs) 20 50 15
Configuration Field Training (Hrs) 20 0 20
Maintanence Field Training (Hrs) 10 0 10
Total Hours per 50 50 45
Cost per hour 40.00$                   35.00$                  60.00$                  
Number each 2 1 1
Total Cost 4,000.00$              1,750.00$             2,700.00$             8,450.00$             
1.08 Risk 51,619.17$            25,756.88$           77,376.06$           
































APPENDIX C: PRODUCTION LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS 
TABLE 
Production CY06$
Cost Element 01 JMIC 02 JMIP 03 Other Total Cost
2.0 Production Totals 46,939,555.25$        21,612,355.81$    3,053,214.15$      71,605,125.22$        
2.01 Non-recurring production 800,000.00$             1,500,000.00$      2,300,000.00$          
2.011 Initial Production Facilities 800,000.00$             1,500,000.00$      
2.012 Other Non-recurring Prod
Non-recurring manufact factor 0.16                      8,730.00$                 
2.02 Recurring production 39,956,878.60$        17,410,175.87$    3,053,214.15$      60,420,268.62$        
2.021 Manufacturing 38,641,729.11$        16,888,624.61$    800,000.00$         56,330,353.72$        
LC 0.87 0.87                      
Slope(b) -0.200913 -0.200913
First Unit Cost T1 2,256.8462$             11,418.7741$       
b+1 0.799087306 0.799087306        
N 150,000.00               7,000.00               
2.022 Recurring Engineering 2,253,214.15$      2,253,214.15$          
Eng Services Factor 0.01 563,303.54$         
Prod Suppt Eng Factor 0.03 1,689,910.61$      
2.023 Sustaining Tooling 155,897.62$             14,892.52$           170,790.14$             
Historical Step down factor 0.5
2.024 Quality Control 1,159,251.87$          506,658.74$         1,665,910.61$          
Quality Control Factor 0.03
2.03 Engineering Changes 1,159,251.87$          506,658.74$         1,665,910.61$          
ECO Factor 0.03
2.04 Training N/A N/A N/A
2.05 Initial Spares Reparables 5,023,424.78$          2,195,521.20$      7,218,945.98$          




































APPENDIX D: O&S LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS TABLE 
O&S CY06$
Cost Element 01 JMIC 02 JMIP 03 Other Total Cost
3.0 O&S Totals 10,686,563.39$   2,380,662.75$      13,067,226.14$         
3.1
Military Personnel Dir Fund 
Elements N/A N/A N/A
3.2 O&M Funded Elements 10,686,563.39$   2,380,662.75$      13,067,226.14$         
3.21 Annual Repair Cost 3,458,434.76$     755,765.95$         4,214,200.71$           
3.22 Replacement Cost 6,916,869.51$     1,511,531.90$      8,428,401.41$           
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